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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 2020, the world unknowingly changed forever when the World
Health Organization announced that a novel coronavirus originating from Wuhan, China,
was a public health emergency of international concern.1 By March 13, 2020, United
States President Donald J. Trump had declared a national emergency due to the rapid
spread of the highly contagious virus SARS-CoV-2, also known as “COVID-19.”2 The
COVID-19 pandemic caused the worst economic disaster in global history. 3 While the
long-term effects of the U.S. quarantine have yet to be fully recognized, the consequences
on the American economy and judicial system are already emerging with the reopening of
a new and unprecedented society.
This article provides a comprehensive guide for insurance defense of COVID-19
claims and litigating in a post-pandemic American judicial system. Part II begins with an
analysis of business interruption litigation and litigation strategies to defend against claims
from civil authority orders.4 Part III shifts the focus to major lawsuits against directors and
officers from the COVID-19 pandemic and the strongest defenses against liability.5 Part
IV moves toward general liability against employers for third-party bodily injury and harm
from COVID-19 infection and exposure.6 Part V focuses on employee discrimination and
retaliation claims and legal defenses.7 Part VI examines the devastating cases of nursing
home negligence and wrongful death from COVID-19 outbreaks in long term care
facilities and the applicable laws and defenses to each claim.8 Part VII analyzes the
categories of COVID-19 class action litigation and specific litigation strategies available

* Alisa Baird is Chief Corporate Compliance Officer for Cura Digital Health Solutions. The author received her
Juris Doctor from the University of Tulsa College of Law and a Masters of Business Administration with a focus
in Healthcare Administration from Oklahoma Christian University. The author thanks her family and her editors
of this publication.
1. Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19), WHO (June 17, 2020),
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen.
2. Letter from Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, to Secretary Wolf, Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and
Administrator Gaynor (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the White House), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determination-stafford-act/.
3. Coronavirus shock vs. global financial crisis—the worst economic disaster, DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-shock-vs-global-financial-crisis-the-worse-economic-disaster/a-52802211
(last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
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to party-defendants.9 Finally, Part VIII gives an overview of juror mentalities and awards
throughout historical times of crisis and predictions for COVID-19 nuclear verdicts.10
II.

BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES

Businesses in nearly every United States industry suffered significant damage from
the COVID-19 economic shutdown. This reality has led to the inevitable dispute between
business owners and insurance providers over whether insurers should pay the financial
losses sustained by the closures and how much, if any, is recoverable. As a result, the
American legal system has been flooded with litigation against defendant insurers for
recovery of COVID-19 business interruption losses. As insurance defense litigation will
be overwhelmed with these cases for the next several years, it is necessary that defendant
insurers understand which business interruption lawsuits are viable, their strongest
defenses, and how to calculate business losses from government-ordered shutdowns.
A. Civil Authority Orders of Natural Disasters.
Civil authority orders are common provisions found within the business interruption
coverage of a commercial property insurance policy. These provisions commonly apply
when access to the insured’s property is prohibited due to a governmental order issued as
a result of direct physical loss or damage to the business owner’s property or to the
property adjacent to the business. 11 This coverage is most often triggered after a natural
disaster scenario which leaves the land and business structures damaged or destroyed. 12
Hurricanes, tornados, and wildfires are all types of natural disasters which may cause
federal, state, or local governments to shut down access to certain areas of a community
due to hazardous conditions left in the wake of the catastrophe.13 Business losses during
the government-ordered prohibition from access to the employer’s property may be
recoverable under these provisions.14
Some of the most contentious areas of COVID-19 litigation center around debating
the validity of business interruption claims and the calculation of business losses during
the pandemic shutdown.15 While the courts have historically never had an opportunity to

9. See infra Part VII.
10. See infra Part VIII.
11. It should be noted that some policies are written to cover losses resulting only from direct physical loss
or damage to property adjacent to the business, and not damage to the owner’s property itself. See generally
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelaher, Connell & Conner,
P.C. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 440 F. Supp. 3d 520 (D.S.C. 2020).
12. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; Assurance Co. Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., 593 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003).
13. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; Assurance Co., 593 S.E.2d 7.
14. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520.
15. See, e.g., Bethan Moorcraft, Chubb sued by human rights non-profit over COVID-19 business
interruption
coverage,
INS.
BUS.
AM.
(Apr.
29,
2020),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/chubb-sued-by-human-rights-nonprofit-overcovid19-business-interruption-coverage-221072.aspx; Lyle Adriano, Six insurers face federal class action
lawsuits for denying business interruption claims, INS. BUS. AM. (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/six-insurers-face-federal-class-actionlawsuits-for-denying-business-interruption-claims-220062.aspx.
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interpret a virus in the context of inclusionary losses, that precedent is forthcoming. 16 At
least six (6) major insurance providers are now named defendants in civil class action
lawsuits by business owners seeking recovery of COVID-19 business interruption
losses.17
B. COVID-19 Business Interruption Defenses.
When an insurance company is sued for the recovery of business interruption losses
resulting from the COVID-19 economic shutdown, there are several defenses it must raise
in order to successfully litigate the exclusion. Plaintiffs have a difficult burden showing
COVID-19 civil authority orders are within the subject policy’s intended inclusionary
losses. The first argument a defendant must raise is the element of direct physical loss or
damage to property. Since civil authority orders require physical loss or damage to the
business owner’s property or to the property adjacent to the business, defendant insurers
must litigate on the grounds that the virus does not satisfy this element of the claim. 18
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have gone on the attack with creative arguments in an attempt to
satisfy the property damage requirement.19 Plaintiffs argue that the coronavirus constitutes
property damage because it “physically infects and stays on surfaces of objects or
materials” and the virus contamination causes “a direct physical loss needing remediation
to clean the surfaces of the establishment.” 20 At best, this argument is weak and lacks
primary authority and context.
Historically, courts have held that the “physical loss or damage” burden is met when
“an item of tangible property has been physically altered by perils such as fire or water.”21
Albeit, a virus may cause physical harm to a human being, but it cannot visibly alter the
tangible structure of a business. Insurance defendants must argue longstanding law that
“physical damage” by its ordinary meaning excludes damage that does not physically
disturb the building structure or is incorporeal.22
However, even if courts find the virus satisfies the property damage or loss
requirement, defendant insurers may successfully develop a litigation strategy based on
the rationale for the shutdown. Every state across the country has experienced its own
unique set of quarantine orders. State governors and local lawmakers each developed their
own rules and enforcement for non-essential business shutdowns.23 An insurance
16. See, e.g., Moorcraft, supra note 15; Adriano, supra note 15.
17. The insurance company defendants are Aspen American Insurance, Auto-Owners Insurance, Lloyd’s of
London, Society Insurance, Oregon Mutual Insurance, and Topa Insurance Company. Adriano, supra note 15.
18. See generally United Air Lines, 439 F.3d 128; Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; MRI Healthcare Ctr.
Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 187 Cal. App. 4th 766 (2010).
19. See Complaint, French Laundry Partners, LP, et al. v. Hartford Fire Ins., et al. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25,
2020).
20. See Complaint, Cajun Conti LLC, et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et al., No. 2020-CC01183 (2020) (available at https://www.insurancejournal.com/research/app/uploads/2020/03/Oceana-Petitionfor-Dec-J-executed.pdf).
21. MRI Healthcare, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 778–79 (internal quotations omitted).
22. See generally id.; Complaint, French Laundry Partners (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020).
23. See, e.g., Press Release, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR GREG ABBOTT, Governor Abbot Issues Executive Order,
Implements Statewide Essential Services And Activities Protocols (Mar. 31, 2020) (on file with author); Okla.
Exec. Order No. 2020-04 (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.cityoftulsa.org/media/12617/2020-04.pdf; J. Clay
CTY.
(Apr.
18,
2020),
Jenkins,
Safer
At
Home
Order,
DALLAS
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defendant may succeed in litigation by arguing that the business did not close due to
property damage by the virus, but that the shutdown orders came as a result of a public
health crisis. As civil authority orders require the government’s interference with a
business to be the direct result of physical damage or loss of the insured’s property or the
property adjacent to it, then all shutdowns made from fear of the outbreak or as
precautionary measures do not satisfy the requirement.24
This distinction was emphasized by the court in Jones Walker when Plaintiffs filed
suit for business income losses as a result of shutdown orders over Hurricane Gustav. 25
The Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana, ordered a mandatory evacuation and “cited
anticipated high tides and the possibility of hurricane-force winds and widespread severe
flooding among [other factors]” which made the shutdown necessary.26 The Jones Walker
court held that the Plaintiff could not establish the required nexus between the civil
authority order and the actual property damage or loss from the hurricane because the
prohibition was issued in anticipation of a possible catastrophic occurrence.27
Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and business
interruption losses were denied by the court.28
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, Plaintiff United Air
Lines, Inc. (“United”) sued Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“ISOP”)
seeking indemnity for losses suffered as a result of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
on the New York City World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.29
United had a ticket office in the World Trade Center which was destroyed during the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.30 It was not disputed that United could recover for
lost earnings attributable to the ticket office’s physical damage.31 However, United’s
Arlington facilities suffered no significant physical damage as a result of the attack on the
Pentagon.32
The court determined that, for United to recover business losses, it would be
“required to demonstrate that the business interruption at issue resulted from either 1)
physical damage to property at the insured location in question, i.e., the Airport, or 2) an
order of civil authority as a direct result of physical damage to property adjacent to the
insured location in question.”33
In granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court held it was
factually impossible for United to show that its facilities closed as a direct result of damage
to the Pentagon; the airport’s shutdown occurred prior to the attack on the Pentagon.34 The
https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/covid-19/orders-media/041820-DallasCountyOrder.pdf.
24. Order and Reasons at 6–7, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP v. Chubb Corp.
et al., No. 09-6057 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2020).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 14–15.
29. United Air Lines, Inc., 439 F.3d at 129.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. United contends that the Pentagon fulfilled this requirement. Id.
34. United Air Lines, 439 F.3d at 134.
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court explained that the government’s decision to halt air travel was based on fears of
future attacks and not the result of destruction to the Pentagon.35 COVID-19 government
shutdown orders are generally a comparable scenario. Several U.S. states and local
governments closed non-essential businesses as a preventative public health control
measure during the early stages of the pandemic.36
For example, Governor Gina Raimondo of Rhode Island went to great lengths to
attempt to protect the state from outsiders fleeing to Rhode Island seeking refuge from
neighboring states with high infection rates.37 With the largest pandemic crisis centered
around New York City, Governor Raimondo conceded that a surge in Rhode Island cases
was inevitable and that the state must prepare for a state-wide public health crisis.38
Accordingly, insurance defendants litigating in states such as Rhode Island have a strong
defense that the civil authority orders were responsive to the anticipation of a catastrophic
COVID-19 occurrence and not due to an actual outbreak of high magnitude.
Next, a defendant insurer may prevail on the plain language within the government’s
civil authority order.39 Plaintiffs seeking compensation for business interruption losses
must show a complete prohibition to access their property during the government-ordered
shutdown.40 For now, this requirement is somewhat of an overlooked caveat in COVID19 business interruption litigation.41 The majority of non-essential business shutdowns do
not completely prohibit the owner from accessing their property.42 For example, the
majority of states followed the White House and Center for Disease Control and
Prevention guidelines, which directed citizens to avoid eating and drinking in bars,
restaurants, and food courts.43 State and local government shutdowns prohibited in-person
dining at these establishments but allowed the non-essential businesses to remain open for

35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Georgia Governor Brian Kemp announced that he made the decision to initiate a civil authority
order shutdown after learning that COVID-19 may be transmitted by non-symptomatic carriers. Greg Bluestein,
Georgia governor to order shelter in place to curb coronavirus, AJC (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/breaking-georgia-governor-orders-shelter-place-curbcoronavirus/vdAoWkjq39W2usr9e8W8BL/. Missouri Governor Mike Parson announced the state’s need to “stay
ahead of the battle” with the enforcement of his stay-at-home order. @GovParsonMO, TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2020,
5:04 PM), https://twitter.com/GovParsonMO/status/1246196795107160064?s=20.
37. See R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-13 (Mar. 28, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/ExecutiveOrder-20-13.pdf.
38. See id.; G. Wayne Miller, R.I. Tightens Restrictions After 2 Virus Deaths, PROVIDENCE J. (Mar. 28, 2020,
1:28 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20200328/ri-tightens-restrictions-after-2-virus-deaths.
39. See S. Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004).
40. See id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
41. See generally S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137.
42. For example, Alabama, Louisiana, Illinois and Texas are among many states that have limited nonessential businesses such as restaurants to drive-through and takeout orders only. See Scott Harris, State Health
Officer, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by
COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf;
Ill. COVID-19 Exec. Order No. 8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/ExecutiveOrders/ExecutiveOrder2020-10.aspx; Tex. Exec. Order No. GA 14 (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-14_Statewide_Essential_Service_and_Activity_COVID19_IMAGE_03-31-2020.pdf.
43. See CDC, Considerations for Events and Gatherings (last updated Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/large-events/mass-gatherings-ready-for-covid19.html.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/4

6

Baird: Litigating an Invisible Enemy: Will the United States Insurance I

2021]

LITIGATING AN INVISIBLE ENEMY

175

drive-through, delivery, and takeout orders.44 Essentially, business owners were not
completely prohibited from access to their property. The courts commonly rule in line with
this argument in circumstances of natural disasters. 45
In Southern Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., an Oklahoma hotel owner
(“Southern Hospitality”) sought business losses resulting from canceled reservations after
U.S. air travel was halted by government order during the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.46 The dispute between the parties centered on what constituted prohibited access
to the hotel’s property.47 The hotel’s business interruption coverage contained a civil
authority order provision which read:
Civil Authority. We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain and necessary
Extra Expense caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to the described
premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to property, other than at the described
premises, caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss. This coverage will apply
for a period of up to two consecutive weeks from the date of that action.48

Southern Hospitality argued that the airport closures completely prohibited out-ofstate customers from accessing the hotel, which resulted in substantial business losses, and
that the court should interpret this prohibition as an inclusionary business interruption. 49
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant insurer contended the order did not
actually prohibit hotel access but only frustrated it to some extent.50 Further, the hotel’s
insurance policy was a contract under Oklahoma law and must be enforced by its plain
and ordinary meaning.51
The Southern Hospitality court found that, while it was factually undisputed the
hotel indeed remained open during the shutdown, the issue was whether the civil authority
order constituted prohibited access to the property.52 The court reasoned that “the plain
and ordinary meaning of ‘prohibit’ is to ‘formally forbid, esp. by authority’ or ‘prevent[,]’”
and that “‘[a]ccess’ means ‘a way of approaching or reaching or entering.’”53 While the
hotel’s business was frustrated by the shutdown, it did not completely deny access to the
property.54
When the law is applied to COVID-19 cases, defendant insurers will likely prevail
on summary judgment in a large percentage of business interruption claims by restaurant

44. See, e.g., Scott Harris, State Health Officer, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public
Gatherings
Due
to
Risk
of
Infection
by
COVID-19
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf; Ill. COVID-19 Exec. Order
No. 8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-10.aspx; Tex.
Exec. Order No. GA 14 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA14_Statewide_Essential_Service_and_Activity_COVID-19_IMAGE_03-31-2020.pdf.
45. See, e.g., S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137.
46. Id. at 1138
47. See id. at 1139–40.
48. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1139–40.
50. S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d at 1140.
51. Id. at 1139.
52. Id. at 1139–40.
53. Id. at 1139–40.
54. Id.
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and other non-essential business owners where business operations were frustrated but not
completely prohibited during the economic shutdown.55
C. How to Calculate COVID-19 Business Losses.
There are two widely accepted methods to calculate business interruption losses in
natural disaster scenarios: the Post-Catastrophe Economy Ignored Approach and PostCatastrophe Economy Considered Approach.56 The majority of federal and state courts
follow one of these two methods to calculate natural disaster business interruption losses.57
In the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach, business losses are calculated in a scenario as
if the catastrophe never occurred.58 In other words, the value of the business interruption
is determined solely on historical sales data. 59 In the Post-Catastrophe Economy
Considered Approach, business interruption losses consider a business’s profitability
during a hypothetical scenario that the catastrophe occurred but the business was not
damaged and remained open.60 In this approach, the actual profits after the business
reopens are critical to the calculation.61
In cases where defendant insurers are responsible for COVID-19 business losses, it
is necessary they understand lost profits analyses for business interruption claims. As
previous litigation has shown, how business losses should be calculated is a heavily
litigated area of the law; the outcome may mean the difference of millions of dollars. 62
This risk is exemplified in the Fifth Circuit case, Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial
Palace of Mississippi, Inc., when Hurricane Katrina damaged the Imperial Palace casino,
forcing a government-ordered shutdown.63 Once Imperial Palace reopened, its revenues
spiked dramatically more than its pre-hurricane revenue.64 The main issue before the
Imperial Palace court was how to compute the casino’s business losses. 65 The parties’
disagreement on how the business interruption should be calculated was the difference of
over $70 million.66
The insurance company argued the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach should be
used and that the business losses should be based on Imperial Palace’s profits as if

55. See generally S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137.
56. See Christopher French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses,
30 GA. L.J. 461 (2014); compare Berk-Cohen Assocs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 433 Fed. App’x 268 (5th
Cir. 2011), with Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats Inc., No. 93-2349-CIV-GRAHAM, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21068 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1994).
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. See sources cited supra note 56.
59. See sources cited supra note 56.
60. See Christopher French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses,
30 GA. L.J. 461 (2014); compare Berk-Cohen Assocs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 433 Fed. App’x 268 (5th
Cir. 2011), with Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats Inc., No. 93-2349-CIV-GRAHAM, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21068 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1994) (holding that taking advantage of economic opportunities such as an
increase in demand after Hurricane Andrew was not within the scope of the policy).
61. See sources cited supra note 60.
62. See Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2010).
63. Id. at 512.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Hurricane Katrina had never hit.67 In other words, the court should only look at prehurricane profits.68 In contrast, Imperial Palace argued that “the correct hypothetical was
not one in which Hurricane Katrina did not strike at all; it was one in which Hurricane
Katrina struck but did not damage Imperial Palace’s facilities.” 69 Imperial Palace pushed
for the Post-Catastrophe Considered Approach which included consideration of profits
earned when it reopened after Katrina.70 The Imperial Palace court held it was a
jurisdiction utilizing the Post-Catastrophe Economy Ignored Approach and that it would
not “look prospectively to what occurred after the loss.” 71 Thus, Imperial Palace was
unable to benefit from its inflated revenue stream resulting from the natural disaster. 72
III. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
On March 4, 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) released an
order cautioning companies to inform investors of potential COVID-19-related business
risks.73 Unfortunately, the SEC’s cautionary statement did not appear to prevent corrupt
practices within the corporate sector.74 By April 2020, the first wave of allegations
involving coronavirus-related securities fraud and misconduct by major corporate
directors and officers (“D&O”) went public.75 Initially, there was a fair amount of
skepticism as to whether any of these allegations of executive misconduct would ever see
the light of a courtroom. After all, a D&O claim had never been litigated in connection
with any other virus outbreak in recent history.76 This skepticism was quickly put to rest
with the swift filings of securities class action lawsuits against two major corporations in
the medical and tourism industries—Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Norwegian Cruise
Lines.77 The allegations against the directors and officers range from wrongful public
misstatements to blatantly misleading sales tactics.78 As the American economy
experiences tremendous obstacles from the COVID-19 pandemic, directors and officers
must adjust to fulfill their fiduciary duties to their corporations and do so without running
afoul of securities laws.

67. Catlin Syndicate, Ltd., 600 F.3d at 513.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 516. The Court previously used the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach in Finger Furniture. Finger
Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005).
72. See Catlin Syndicate, Ltd., 600 F.3d 511.
73. See S.E.C. Notice, 85 Fed. Reg. 17610 (Mar. 30, 2020).
74. See Complaint, McDermid, et al. v. Inovio Pharms., Inc., et al., No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP (E.D. Pa. 2020);
Complaint, Douglas, et al. v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, et al., No. 1:20-cv-21107 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
75. See Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP (2020); Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
76. E.g., there were no securities lawsuits filed against directors or officers during the MERS, SARS, or Ebola
outbreaks. See Philipp Strasser & Jan Phillip Meyer, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in Times of a Global
Pandemic Crisis - Do Desperate Times Really Call for Desperate Measures?, LEGAL500, https://www.vhmlaw.at/UserFiles/Media/downloads/docs/200330_PhS-JM_D-O-Liability_COVID19.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2021).
77. Complaint at 1, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP; Complaint at 5, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
78. See Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
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A. Norwegian Cruise Lines and the COVID-19 Smokescreen.
The COVID-19 outbreak tested the ethical standards of many businesses and
corporations with the sudden and dramatic halt of the global economy. The dilemma was
real for many corporate executives—disclose potential business/market-related
disruptions and risk bankruptcy or keep up appearances to gain marketable securities.
Certain shareholders highlighted this predicament in their securities class action
lawsuit against Norwegian Cruise Lines (“Norwegian”), its Chief Executive Officer, Frank
J. Del Rio (“Del Rio”), and Chief Financial Officer, Mark A. Kempa (“Kempa”).79
Plaintiffs to the lawsuit represent shareholders who purchased shares from February 20,
2020, through March 12, 2020.80 The class period began on February 20, 2020, when
Norwegian published its COVID-19 press release along with its Form 8-K filed with the
SEC.81 The press release stated that Norwegian’s cruise sales flourished in spite of the
pandemic and that the company was even ahead of its yearly sales goals.82 Norwegian
partly attributed its success to having “proactively implemented several preventive
measures to reduce potential exposure and transmission of COVID-19” and boasted that
the company “has an exemplary track record of demonstrating its resilience in challenging
environments.”83
On February 27, 2020, Norwegian filed a Form 10-K with the SEC which stated that
the company “must meet the U.S. Public Health Service’s requirements” and noted that it
was rated “at the top of the range of CDC and FDA scores achieved by the major cruise
lines.”84 Norwegian cited its 10-K risk factors as “[t]he spread of the COVID-19
coronavirus, particularly in North America, could exacerbate its effect on [Norwegian].”85
Any future wide-ranging health scares would also likely “adversely affect [Norwegian’s]
business, financial condition, and results of operations.”86 Shareholder Plaintiffs allege
that these and several other statements within Norwegian’s SEC filings were intentionally
inaccurate and misleading.87
Shareholder Plaintiffs allege that Norwegian’s D&Os made false and misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) the Company was employing sales tactics of providing customers with unproven and/or
blatantly false statements about COVID-19 to entice customers to purchase cruises, thus
endangering the lives of both their customers and crew members; and (2) as a result,
Defendants’ statements regarding the Company’s business and operations were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.88

Plaintiffs bolstered their claims by reference to allegedly leaked emails from
79. Complaint, Norwegian Cruise Lines, et al., No. 1:20-cv-21107 (2020).
80. Id. at 1–2.
81. Complaint at 5, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. Norwegian’s Form 8-K contained its stable financial results
for fourth quarter 2019 and year-end 2019.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS LTD., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 33 (2019).
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 41.
87. Complaint at 13–14, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
88. Id. at 7.
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Norwegian executives grooming their employees on how to publicly downplay COVID19.89 In a March 11, 2020, Miami New Times exposé entitled “Leaked Emails: Norwegian
Pressures Sales Team to Mislead Potential Customers About Coronavirus,” the first
allegations of corporate misrepresentations were made against Norwegian. 90 The article
published a series of “leaked emails” which appear to show Norwegian executive officers
directing sales staff to lie to customers about COVID-19 and pressuring them to make
unrealistically high sales quotas during the industry slump.91 Employees were even
provided scripted answers to give to customers, such as that the coronavirus cannot survive
or infect people in the warm climates of the Caribbean.92
On March 12, 2020, the Washington Post ran an article entitled “Norwegian Cruise
Line Managers Urged Salespeople to Spread Falsehoods About Coronavirus” which
alleged even more misconduct by the corporation’s directors and officers. 93 The article
reported that leaked internal memoranda included statements such as “[t]he coronavirus
will not affect you” and “Fact: Coronavirus in humans is an ‘overhyped pandemic
scare.’”94 The article quotes unnamed company executives as being furious by the alleged
email leaks and quotes one executive as stating, “[o]ne of our own ratted.”95
Following the negative press coverage, Norwegian’s share price dramatically
dropped 26.7%—resulting in losses for investors.96 Plaintiff shareholders allege the losses
were the direct result of the wrongful misstatements and misleading sales tactics of
Norwegian directors and officers.97
B. Inovio Pharmaceuticals and the COVID-19 Bait-and-switch.
On March 12, 2020, the second COVID-19-related securities class action lawsuit
was filed against Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Inovio”) and its Chief Executive Officer,
J. Joseph Kim (“Kim”). 98 Plaintiff shareholders allege that, on February 14, 2020, Kim
appeared on Fox Business News and announced Inovio had developed a COVID-19
vaccine in only three (3) hours after obtaining the DNA sequence from the virus. 99 Kim
further declared that Inovio’s “goal is to start phase one human testing in the U.S. early
this summer.”100 Inovio’s stock rose more than ten percent within days after the
broadcast.101
89. Id.
90. Alexi C. Cardona, Leaked Emails: Norwegian Pressures Sales Team to Mislead Potential Customers
About Coronavirus, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/coronavirusnorwegian-cruise-line-leaked-emails-show-booking-strategy-11590056.
91. Id.; Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107 (2020).
92. Id.
93. See Drew Harwell, Norwegian Cruise Line managers urged salespeople to spread falsehoods about
coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/12/norwegiancruise-line-managers-urged-salespeople-spread-falsehoods-about-coronavirus/.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Complaint at 8, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
97. Id. at 14.
98. See Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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On March 2, 2020, President Donald J. Trump had a meeting with several leaders in
the medical and pharmaceutical industries to discuss the U.S. plan of action for the
COVID-19 national crisis.102 The meeting was highly publicized and nationally broadcast
through multiple media outlets.103 Kim attended this meeting at the White House on behalf
of Inovio to discuss its medical breakthroughs with regard to the virus.104 While speaking
to President Trump during the live broadcast, Kim again stated that Inovio had developed
a COVID-19 vaccine within three (3) hours and that human testing would begin in April
2020.105 After the White House conference, Inovio’s share price “more than quadrupled”
reaching an intraday high of $19.36 on March 9, 2020. 106
The excitement would not last long. On March 9, 2020—the same day as Inovio’s
intraday-high record—Citron Research released a statement on social media: “[@Inovio]
SEC should immediately HALT this stock and investigate the ludicrous and dangerous
claim that they designed a vaccine in 3 hours. This has been a serial stock promotion for
years. This will trade back to $2. Investors have been warned.” 107
The day after Citron Research’s Twitter statement, Inovio’s share price dropped
from $18.72 to $9.83 per share.108 This drop represented a 71% decline from the shareclass-period high and a $643 million loss of market capitalization.109 After the Citron
Research statement, Inovio allegedly attempted damage control by qualifying its previous
statements as not actually having created a vaccine, but having designed a “vaccine
construct.”110
Plaintiff shareholders filed their securities class action lawsuit alleging that Inovio
and its CEO, J. Joseph Kim, “falsely described their product as a fully completed vaccine
when it was nothing of the sort.” 111 The defendants “falsely claimed they had developed
the vaccine in a matter of hours which is a scientific impossibility.”112 The defendants also
“falsely state[d] that they would be able to begin human trials in April 2020 when they had
no reason to believe that they would have the necessary regulatory approvals to do so.”113
Plaintiffs alleged corporations and executives have used COVID-19 as an
opportunity to portray themselves as positioned to take advantage of the outbreak or as
positioned to prosper because of the outbreak.114 Despite the lack of precedent for D&O
liability during pandemic-induced economic downturns, the post-pandemic American
judicial system will likely become overwhelmed by shareholders who experienced

102. Id.
103. Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4.
107. @CitronResearch,
TWITTER
(Mar.
9,
2020,
9:38
AM),
https://twitter.com/CitronResearch/status/1237025059056709632.
108. Complaint at 4, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP.
109. Id.
110. Id. To analogize, Inovio’s statement is like saying it built a house and then later stating it only meant that
it had the blueprints designed.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Complaint at 7, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP.
114. See id.
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substantial losses during the 2020 stock market crash.
C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Litigation and Defenses.
Norwegian’s and Inovio’s corporate misstatements and fraudulent behavior are
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.115 The Plaintiffs in these
securities class action lawsuits alleged that corporate executives blatantly misled their
investors and artificially inflated stock prices.116 Specifically, Norwegian and Inovio are
alleged to have violated Section 10(b) (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.117

Additionally, the directors and officers are alleged to be liable in their individual
capacities under Section 20(a) (15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)) which states:
Joint and several liability; good faith defense. Every person who, directly or indirectly,
controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter [15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a et seq.] or
of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable
(including to the Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of
section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.118

At first blush, securities lawsuits against corporate directors and officers for
COVID-19-related misconduct may appear to be plaintiff’s verdict cases. In reality, D&O
defendants have strong defenses to refute the presumed nexus of alleged corporate
misconduct and shareholder losses.119 The number of strong defenses are due largely to
the pandemic’s overall devastation to the American economy.120 COVID-19 will
undoubtedly cause a record-setting recession and the totality of its impact is not yet
recognized.121 Simply put, the American economy went “[f]rom full throttle to sudden

115. See id.; Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107.
116. See sources cited supra note 115.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
118. 15 U.S.C. 78t(a).
119. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 355, 654 S.E.2d 207
(2007).
120. Kathleen Howley, COVID-19 will cause a record-setting recession, economist say, HOUSINGWIRE (Mar.
27, 2020), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/covid-19-will-cause-a-steep-recession-followed-by-a-bounceback/.
121. Id.
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stop” according to Wells Fargo economists.122
COVID-19 caused the history’s largest point crash for the Dow Jones Industrial
Average on March 9, 2020—one week later, it did it again.123 The Dow hit a record
2,997.10 loss on March 16, 2020, beating even the 1929 Black Monday record low. 124
The downward spiral caused by COVID-19 fears continued worsening as global fears of
the virus heightened, businesses shut down, and oil prices plummeted.125
As a result, D&O defendants must heavily focus their litigation strategy on loss
causation. By a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff shareholders must prove their
share losses came as a direct result of the D&O’s misrepresentations or fraudulent
behavior. The extrinsic circumstances of the American economy make this a nearly
impossible burden to prove. In an economy where there are significant domestic and
international travel bans in place, the stock market broke record lows twice in one week,
national agricultural production is at an all-time low, the oil and gas industry is on the
brink of bankruptcy, and over twenty-six (26) million Americans are unemployed, a
plaintiff is unlikely to prove that corporate executives’ conduct was the absolute cause of
their share loss. Defendants will successfully raise doubt as to a plaintiff shareholder’s
securities claims by arguing that a pandemic American economy caused the stock market
to crash. Whether D&O misconduct or omissions occurred or not, the outcome is the same.
Further, D&O defendants must litigate aggressively that the timeline of events
surrounding the share loss alone is not enough for liability. Basically, the fact that share
prices dropped only after ‘the truth’ of D&O wrongdoing became public is not enough to
prove the losses resulted from such conduct. The courts have long held that the sequence
of events leading to share losses does not satisfy causation. 126 For example, the Supreme
Court case Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo involves a group of people who purchased stock
from Dura Pharmaceuticals between April 15, 1997, and February 24, 1998
(“Respondents”).127 Respondents brought a securities fraud class action against Dura
Pharmaceuticals and some of its managers and directors (“Dura”).128 Respondents
claimed: (1) Dura made false statements regarding profits; (2) Dura falsely claimed the
Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) would soon approve an asthmatic spray device; (3)
Dura stated in February 1998 that sales would be low; (4) Dura announced eight months
later that the FDA would not approve the spray device; and (5) Dura’s stock dropped in
value the next day and recovered within a week.129 Most importantly, Respondents
claimed they had paid an inflated price for stock and thereby suffered damages.130
The District Court dismissed the complaint holding it failed to allege loss causation

122. Id.
123. Kimberly Amadeo, How Does the 2020 Stock Market Crash Compare With Others?, THE BALANCE (last
updated Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/fundamentals-of-the-2020-market-crash-4799950.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
127. Id. at 339.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 340.
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adequately.131 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part the spray device claim holding
Respondents had adequately alleged loss causation. The Ninth Circuit reasoned: “plaintiffs
establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase was
inflated because of the misrepresentation.”132 The Supreme Court granted certiorari since
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was different from other Circuits’ holdings. The Supreme
Court stated that, to adequately plead a Section 10(b) claim “involving publicly traded
securities and purchases or sales in public securities markets,” a plaintiff must sufficiently
plead:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission) . . . (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind
. . . ; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security . . . ; (4) reliance, often referred
to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction
causation . . . (5) economic loss . . . and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection
between the material misrepresentation and the loss. . . .133

The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and claimed it is simply
“wrong.”134 The Supreme Court reasoned there is no suffered loss since the ownership of
a share offsets the inflated purchase. In fact, shares are usually purchased with the mindset
of selling at a later date; and if the shares were sold before the FDA news came out, there
would be no loss.135 Furthermore, if sold at a loss at a later date, the loss may not be
directly attributable to the misrepresentation but due to other reasons. 136 For example, a
change in “economic circumstances, altered investor expectations, new industry-specific
or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events” considered separately or as a whole
may have changed the prices.137 The Supreme Court opines that, although the securities
statute is in place to maintain public confidence in the marketplace, it is “not to provide
investors with broad insurance against market losses.”138
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PSLR”) contends that securities fraud complaints must “specify” every
misleading statement with all facts “on which that belief” was “formed” and “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”139 Although the Supreme Court accepts that the pleading rules are
not in place to inflict a great burden on a plaintiff, the rules do not allow “a plaintiff to
forgo giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has
in mind would bring about harm.”140 Respondents’ Complaint failed because merely
alleging that Dura’s share price dropped after the truth came out is insufficient alone to
prove causation for the price inflation.141 Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Dura Pharms, Inc., 544 U.S. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
Id. at 342.
Id.
Dura Pharms, Inc., 544 U.S. at 343.
Id.
Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
Id. at 347.
Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347.
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Circuit’s judgment.142
This case applies directly to SEC litigation where plaintiffs claim a plunge in stock
market prices was due to alleged misrepresentation of directors and officers.
Consequently, D&O defendants have an advantage in COVID-19 litigation as loss
causation will be nearly impossible for a plaintiff shareholder to prove in a securities class
action lawsuit.
IV.

BUSINESS NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN THIRD-PARTY BODILY INJURY AND HARM

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”) defines a safe
workplace as being “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm” to employees.143 The United States saw thousands of
work-related deaths leading up to the enactment of the OSH Act.144 The majority of these
deaths were from the manual labor workforce who contributed to the coal mining, factory,
and steel industries.145 The legislative intent behind the OSH Act was to regulate highrisk-job industries to prevent or minimize on-the-job injuries and illnesses from negligent
business practices.146 With that understanding in mind, the relevant questions at hand are
what constitutes a ‘safe work environment’ during times of a pandemic and whether
businesses recognized and negated COVID-19 work-related hazards? These questions are
currently the center of COVID-19 employer negligence claims across the country.147
A. Negligence Torts in Business Practice.
Many employers who kept operations running during the early days of the pandemic
have experienced some level of internal or public backlash for their business decisions.148
Much of the criticism stems from allegations that employers negligently placed employees
and/or customers in situations where they became infected or were at high risk of exposure
to COVID-19.149
The most highly publicized examples of alleged business negligence during the
COVID-19 public health crisis are the claims against Princess Cruise Lines
(“Princess”).150 Princess first received criticism in the early days of the pandemic when it
continued sailing within Asia despite the continent’s mounting health concerns.151
142. Id.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970).
144. Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/abogutdol/history/osha (last visited May 7, 2020).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Jay Barmann, Grand Princess Passengers Sue Cruise Line For Negligence, SFIST (Apr. 9,
2020),
https://sfist.com/2020/04/09/nine-grand-princess-cruise-passengers-are-suing-cruise-line-fornegligence/; Vin Gurrieri, Ex-Walmart Worker’s Death Spurs ‘First’ Ill. COVID Death Suit, LAW360 (Apr. 6,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1260853/ex-walmart-worker-s-death-spurs-first-ill-covid-death-suit;
Complaint, Dalton, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 2:20-cv-02458 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
148. See, e.g., Joshua Espinoza, Whole Foods Gets Backlash for Reportedly Recommending Employees
Donate Their PTO During Coronavirus, COMPLEX (Mar. 13, 2020), https://sfist.com/2020/04/09/nine-grandprincess-cruise-passengers-are-suing-cruise-line-for-negligence.
149. See, e.g., id.; Gurrieri, supra note 147.
150. Complaint, Dalton, No. 2:20-cv-02458.
151. See generally id.
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Specifically, seven (7) notable lawsuits are pending against Princess in which passengers
have alleged the company “failed to implement proper screening procedures and took a
‘lackadaisical approach’ to customer safety.”152 According to Plaintiffs, these accusations
came after Princess proceeded with a voyage on February 21, 2020, “despite knowing that
two passengers who disembarked the ship from a prior voyage had COVID-19
symptoms.”153 In addition, Plaintiffs accused the company of failing to inform passengers
that “sixty-two passengers and crew [members] who were previously onboard with the
passengers who experienced the COVID-19 symptoms were also on board with
[P]laintiffs.”154 Collectively, Plaintiffs accused the cruise company of breaching its duty
of care in that it had knowledge of the prior passengers’ symptoms and failed to inform
and protect Plaintiffs from “exposure to the risk of immediate physical injury” which
caused “emotional distress and trauma from fear of contracting the virus.”155
Similarly, Walmart has been sued for negligence over the death of a COVID-19infected employee.156 Walmart allegedly failed to exercise reasonable care to keep its store
as follows:
. . . in a safe and healthy environment and, in particular, to protect employees, customers and
other individuals within the store from contracting COVID-19 when it knew or should have
known that individuals at the store were at a very high risk of infection and exposure due to
the high volume of individuals present at and circulating throughout the store on a daily
basis.157

Plaintiff further states that store management failed to properly clean and sterilize
the premises, provide adequate protective gear to employees, or enforce social distancing
recommendations.158 The lawsuit alleges that, “[a]s a direct and proximate cause of the
above acts and/or omissions of negligence, the decedent was infected by COVID-19 and
ultimately died due to complications of COVID-19.”159
In another case, Smithfield Foods, Inc. (“Smithfield”) has denied it was negligent
after several of its Missouri meatpacking employees tested positive for COVID-19.160
Plaintiffs allege they were forced to worked in close proximity to one another, were denied
access to proper protective equipment, and were not allowed to exercise proper social

152. Donna Higgins, Roundup: First COVID-19 suits filed; states and feds weigh legislation, 25 No. 10
WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 02 (Apr. 9, 2020); Complaint, Austin, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd.,
No. 20-cv-2531, 2020 WL 1282232 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Sheedy, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd.,
No. 20-cv-2430, 2020 WL 1231185 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020); Abitbol, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No.
20-cv-2414, complaint filed, 2020 WL 1231198 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Kurivial, et al. v. Princess Cruise
Lines Ltd., No. 20-cv-2361 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Gleason, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 20cv-2328 (C.D. Cal 2020).
153. Complaint, Weissberger, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 20-cv-2267, 2020 WL 1445274 (C.D.
Cal. 2020).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Complaint, Evans v. Walmart, Inc., et al., No. 2020L003938 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2020).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Complaint at 3, Rural Cmty. Workers All., et al. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., et al., No. 5:20-cv-06063
(W.D. Mo. dismissed May 5, 2020).
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hygiene practices during work hours.161 Plaintiffs claim that multiple employees
contracted the virus while working at the meatpacking plant and became ill due to
Smithfield’s acts and/or omissions.162
B. Causation Is Likely Difficult to Satisfy.
To successfully argue negligence, a plaintiff must show that a defendant had a “duty
of care, breached that duty, and that the damages were proximately caused by the
breach.”163 Defendants such as Princess Cruise Lines, Walmart, and Smithfield must focus
their defense heavily on the aspect of proximate cause. Proximate cause has two
components: foreseeability and cause in fact.164 Defendants will likely succeed on a
motion for summary judgment or at trial arguing that the plaintiff could not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that “(i) the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm and (ii) absent the negligence, the harm would not have occurred”—
commonly referred to as the “but for” test. 165
Defendant employers must litigate that the plaintiff cannot make a proximate cause
showing because the array of community exposures to the virus creates irrefutable
reasonable doubt.166 As such, pinpointing a specific instance or event which caused a
person to contract the virus will prove not just extremely challenging, but likely
impossible. Not every person who becomes infected will show symptoms; and even if they
do, it may remain unclear as to how or where a claimant was exposed. 167 Thus, it is
difficult to show that an employer negligently failed to keep employees “free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm”
under the OSH Act.
Further, employers must litigate COVID-19 negligence claims on the credibility of
the witnesses testifying as to the transmission of the disease. COVID-19, like the Ebola
virus and other infectious diseases, “involve[s] matters beyond the common understanding

161. Id. at 13–14.
162. Id. at 18.
163. Texas Health Res., et al. v. Pham, No. 05-15-01283-CV, 2016 WL 4205732, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. 3,
2016) (“The elements of negligence are a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the
breach.”).
164. CDC, How COVID-19 Spreads, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/howcovid-spreads.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019ncov%2Fprepare%2Ftransmission.html (last visited May 7, 2020) (“The virus that causes COVID-19 is
spreading very easily and sustainably between people. Information from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic
suggests that this virus is spreading more efficiently than influenza, but not as efficiently as measles, which is
highly contagious.”).
165. Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *4; Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 278 S.W.3d 901
(Tex. App. 2009); Am. Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Ruvalcaba, 64 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App. petition denied 2001)
(“An invitee enters land with the owner’s knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both.”); see CMH Homes,
Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000); see also Brown v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, 935 P.2d 319.
166. See generally, CDC, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Guidance Documents,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/guidance-list.html?Sort=Date%3A%3Adesc (last
updated Aug. 27, 2020).
167. See Guidance for Businesses and Employers Responding to Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html (last update Jan. 24,
2021).
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of the ordinary lay person, [and thus, causation] must be proved by expert testimony.”168
In Texas Health Resources v. Pham, the Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas concluded that
the “likelihood of transmitting the Ebola virus, assuming different policies and the use of
different protective equipment, is beyond a lay person’s common understanding.”169
Courts should make a similar finding that the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19
through contact tracing is beyond a lay person’s common understanding and will also need
to be proved by expert testimony.170 After all, “[m]ere lay testimony about causation
cannot establish that a claimant has a probable right of recovery.”171 Thus, absent expert
testimony that can arguably establish specific causation, employers will likely prevail
against negligence claims made by plaintiffs.
C. Defending Against Workers’ Compensation Claims.
Under a workers’ compensation claim, an infected employee may seek
compensation through an alternative court or administrative system than those described
above. Employees will argue their claims are valid for workers’ compensation because
they were injured by COVID-19 within the course and scope of their employment. A valid
workers’ compensation claim depends on whether the injury occurred at work and will
most likely apply in scenarios where an employee is required to work during quarantine,
travel to high-risk locations, or return to work after the initial reopening of the business.172
In most jurisdictions, workers’ compensation statutes provide that benefits are the
exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries. Because the virus is not an “injury,” many
jurisdictions have the responsibility to determine if the virus is an “occupational disease”
which generally requires:
1. The illness to have arisen out of and in the course of employment; and
2. The illness to have arisen out of or been caused by conditions peculiar to the work.
Workers’ compensation immunity is a significant hurdle for employees or their
estates to overcome when filing suit against an employer. While workers’ compensation
immunity is jurisdiction-specific, it typically bars any separate lawsuit against the
employer for an injury an employee suffers at work, especially those resulting from
negligence. However, there are very limited exceptions to workers’ compensation
immunity—again, depending on the applicable state law.
As is the case in the civil claims described above, plaintiffs seeking workers’
compensation benefits will also face an uphill battle to prove causation. The airborne
infectious nature of the coronavirus will prove extremely difficult for workers to establish
how, when, or where they were exposed to the virus, which may ultimately bar their
168. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006) (citing Texas Health Res., 2016 WL
4205732, at 5); see also Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2015) (cited by
Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 2016)).
169. Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *5.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *6.
172. PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, WESTLAW, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR COVID-19
LOSSES CHART, PRACTICAL LAW CHECKLIST (available at Westlaw W-024-5319).
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claims. On the other hand, public safety workers enjoy a presumption that their exposure
to a disease like COVID-19 is generally connected to their employment.173
Texas Governor Greg Abbott suspended Texas Government Code §§ 607.002 (1)
and (2) to facilitate public safety workers “who were likely to have been exposed to
COVID-19 while in the course of their employment, to be entitled to the
reimbursements.”174 A gray area that employers must litigate strongly against are claims
made by workers who are deemed “essential” during the pandemic.175 Unlike public safety
workers, essential workers do not enjoy the presumption that COVID-19-related injuries
are connected to their employment. As such, “essential” workers who continued working
during the pandemic will have a difficult time proving that their employment caused their
exposure to the virus.
Additionally, defendant employers should look at their specific workers’
compensation policy language for virus-related exclusions. Commonly, workers’
compensation policies contain exclusionary language for the “ordinary diseases of life.”
Employers should argue that a pandemic is a “force majeure” or “act of God” and that the
health and environmental threats of COVID-19 are a natural occurrence seen many times
throughout the course of humanity.176 Therefore, an employer must argue that, because
the coronavirus pandemic was not a result of business-related negligence and was a
naturally-occurring event, employees are not entitled to compensation under workers’
compensation claims.
D. The Argument for Immunity.
Legislatures and governors are considering providing businesses with full immunity
against employer-related negligence claims relating to the transmission or infection of
COVID-19.177 Immunity from negligence claims would instill a greater sense of security
and confidence to restart the American economy. However, a full immunity solution may
unjustly frustrate the path to legal recourse available to employees and customers with
legitimate claims against businesses for violation of their common law duties; it may also
disincentivize employers from the rigorous implementation of apposite safety precautions.
Ultimately, many costs of such an alternative may reside with federal, state, and
local governments in the form of increased Medicaid expenditures, free care, and other
social welfare protections for the victims of COVID-19 contracted in a commercial setting.
To calm concerns that businesses may not follow all precautionary measures if granted

173. See, e.g., Letter from Cassie Brown, Comm’r Workers’ Comp., Tex. Dep’t Ins., to Tex. Workers’ Comp.
Sys. Participants (Mar. 30, 2020) (on file with Tex. Dep’t Ins.).
174. Id.
175. Press Release, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR GREG ABBOTT, Governor Abbot Issues Executive Order,
Implements Statewide Essential Services And Activities Protocols (Mar. 31, 2020) (on file with author)
(“Essential services shall consist of everything listed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in its
Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce, Version 2.0, plus religious services conducted in
churches, congregations, and houses of worship.”).
176. E.g., Spanish Flu of 1918, Hong Kong Flu of 1968, and H1N1 of 2009.
177. See, e.g., David Morgan, Corporate America seeks legal protection for when coronavirus lockdown lift,
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-liability/corporateamerica-seeks-legal-protection-for-when-coronavirus-lockdowns-lift-idUSKCN223179. This immunity would
exclude claims against an employer for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
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complete immunity, there is an alternative compromise of government-granted qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity may apply to businesses which meet specific precautionary
standards criteria. The criteria would directly relate to the precautionary countermeasures
to COVID-19, including compliance with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) and state virus control guidelines.178Therefore, the qualified immunity option
would not only provide complete immunity for compliant businesses, but would also
provide a pathway for workers and patrons of businesses to pursue legal remedies for
COVID-19 transmission where a business fails to comply with required precautionary
standards.
Governments could further limit business liability by developing targeted immunity
policies which would provide immunity only to those businesses where employees and
patrons necessarily face a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19, namely, healthcare
providers. Several states have already taken such steps including New York,
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Arizona. These targeted protections insulate those businesses
most likely to face COVID-19-related claims, but also run the risk of creating disincentives
to take the maximum level of precautions. However, to alleviate such concerns, targeted
immunity could be conditioned upon a business’s adherence to safety and sanitation
guidelines and could carve out exceptions from liability for willful misconduct or gross
negligence.
V.

EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION

More than twenty-six (26) million Americans lost their employment as a result of
the United States’ economic shutdown during the coronavirus pandemic. 179 In all
likelihood, it will be many years, or even decades, before the damage COVID-19 has
caused on the American workforce is fully realized. As nearly a decade’s worth of
employment gains disappeared during the first several weeks of the pandemic, the United
States’ job loss is on track with numbers during the Great Depression. 180 Foreseeably, the
American judicial system will see an influx of claims by furloughed and terminated
employees who feel that their termination was not strictly for economic reasons, but also
for retaliatory or discriminatory ones. With this in mind, it is vital that employers
understand the changes governing anti-discrimination legislation and the interrelationship
of applicable federal and state laws that regulate the private business sector.
A. Pandemic-related Impact on Longstanding Federal Laws and Regulations.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) enforces federal
anti-discrimination laws which are enumerated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, OSH
Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act, Age Discrimination in

178. E.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, etc.
179. Jeffry Bartash, Jobless claims jump another 4.4 million – 26 million Americans have lost their jobs to the
coronavirus, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/jobless-claims-jumpanother-44-million-25-million-americans-have-lost-their-jobs-to-the-coronavirus-2020-04-23.
180. Heather Long, U.S. now has 22 million unemployed, wiping out a decade of job gains, WASH. POST (Apr.
16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/16/unemployment-claims-coronavirus/.
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Employment Act, and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. 181 Anti-discrimination
laws require employers to provide a safe work environment without discriminating against
employees based on their disability or protected-class status. The pandemic has at least
partially blurred the legal boundaries between employer responsibilities and employee
privacy in their traditional application. What exactly constitutes a disability and actionable
discrimination in the COVID-19 era is the debate shaping the next decade of employment
law litigation.
Perhaps the most obvious defense to wrongful termination or retaliation claims
would be that the layoff was not a result of discrimination but occurred due to the
business’s economic hardships during the pandemic. It will likely be difficult to prove
business interruption losses did not facilitate the need to furlough or terminate employees
without additional evidence of targeted termination or discriminatory behavior.
Traditionally, an employee has the right to refuse to disclose personal medical
information to his or her employer. If the business owner subsequently fires the employee
for this refusal, then the employee has evidence of retaliation and wrongful termination.
Yet in the 2020 pandemic era, the EEOC has announced this is not the case with COVID19-related medical inquiries. Employers have a strong defense against wrongful
termination claims when an employee refuses to cooperate in the employer’s medical
screening protocols. The EEOC has adopted the CDC’s guidelines for workplace
mitigation as legal authority for employers.182
For example, an employer may defend itself against a wrongful termination claim
from an ill employee who refuses to provide pertinent medical information or be medically
screened when coming back to work.183 During a pandemic, employers must mitigate
COVID-19 workplace health concerns as outlined by the EEOC, ADA and CDC. 184 As
long as there is an active threat of the spread of infection, ADA-covered employers have
the right to ask employees for personal medical information when they take sick days off
from work.185 Employees must disclose to an employer if they are experiencing symptoms
of the pandemic virus such as a fever, cough, shortness of breath, etc.186 If the employee
refuses to disclose such information, there are grounds for termination without grounds for
discrimination or retaliation.187
Additionally, employees who refuse to cooperate in workplace screening and safety
protocols will likely forfeit their claims for wrongful termination or retaliation. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, employers are allowed to medically screen employees by way of
temperature checks, enforcement of proper hygiene practices, and social distancing in the
181. What You Should Know About the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Coronavirus, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPP. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/wysk_ada_rehabilitaion_act_coronavirus.cfm (last
visited May 7, 2020).
182. Id. (“The EEO laws, including the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, continue to apply during the time of the
COVID-19 pandemic, but they do not interfere with or prevent employers from following [CDC guidelines].”)
183. See generally id.
184. See Business & Workplaces
subsection of Coronavirus Disease 2019, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/businesses-employers.html (last updated
May 7, 2020).
185. What you should know, supra note 181.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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workplace.188 Employees who refuse to participate in the employer’s reasonable safety
precautions will give cause for termination.189 For instance, an employee who calls into
work sick on a Friday and comes back to the office on Monday cannot refuse to answer
the employer’s reasonable questions about his or her illness or current symptoms. 190 The
employee also cannot refuse a temperature check or an order to socially distance from
other employees or to leave the business until he or she is tested for the virus.191 The ADA
permits mandatory testing by employers as a workplace mitigation strategy because
infected employees reentering the workplace are a direct threat to the health of their
coworkers.192 As such, employers can legally terminate an employee who refuses to
participate in mandatory COVID-19 testing at the workplace on the grounds that the
medical testing was “job related and consistent with business necessity.” 193
Another major COVID-19-related change to longstanding federal
anti-discrimination law is an employer’s level of obligation to provide disabled employees
with work-related accommodations.194 Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, it was held that
the majority of accommodations for disabled employees were reasonable and affordable
within the business’s overall resources and budget.195 The pandemic’s economic impact
on the United States has left many employers with significant difficulty or the inability to
provide employees with many requested accommodations.196 ADA guidelines now allow
for COVID-19-related undue hardship considerations for employers rejecting the requests
of a disabled employee.197 For example, a vision-impaired employee who is teleworking
due to the pandemic may not be granted a request for custom computer screens that are
significantly more expensive than traditional monitors if the additional expense creates an
undue hardship on the financially-strapped employer. It is the employer’s duty to work
with the employee on reasonable alternatives to his or her request, but it is understood that
financial constraints in times of crisis are reasonable grounds for denial of some requested
accommodations without triggering discrimination.198
Overall, federal anti-discrimination laws have expanded the employer’s powers to
control and protect its workforce during the pandemic.199 Employers have the power to
require that employees wear protective gear and follow CDC-approved infection-control
practices and terminate those who refuse to comply with reasonable COVID-19 safety
measures.200 The ADA also permits employers to make disability-related inquiries and

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. What you should know, supra note 181.
191. Id. The only exception to these requirements being if the employer was requesting a disabled employee
to take precautions that were impossible to follow due to their disability (e.g., an employee with a latex allergy
cannot be forced to wear latex gloves). Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. What you should know, supra note 181.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. What you should know, supra note 181. The caveat being that reasonable accommodations must be
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conduct medical exams if there is a direct threat to an employee’s health based on the
available objective medical evidence.201 Even with the additional authority given to
employers during the pandemic, there must be careful consideration as to what measures
constitute reasonable workplace safety measures and unlawful disparate employee
treatment based on protected-class physiognomies.202 The distinction in treatment will
ultimately determine an employer’s success in litigation.
B. Federal and State Law Interrelationships.
The average American is typically familiar with constitutional rights and federal
laws which govern employee discrimination actions. As discussed in the section above,
federal rules and regulations have adapted in consideration of a virus-produced national
crisis. While pandemic considerations are paramount in discrimination and retaliation
litigation, it is necessary to understand specific state laws which interrelate to federal
employment legislation.
Many states have adopted their own disability discrimination acts to supplement the
ADA.203 Some states refer to this legislation as their “Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act”
(“HCRA”) or some variation of the name.204 The state of Michigan has signed into law its
own HCRA which reads, in part, “[An employer shall not] discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.”205
For an employee to successfully prove a prima facie case of discrimination against
his or her employer under Michigan’s HCRA, it must be established that: (1) the plaintiff
is “handicapped” as defined in the HCRA, (2) the handicap is unrelated to the plaintiff’s
ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated
against in one of the ways set forth in the statute. 206
Additionally, states across the country have adopted into their public health codes
several federally based regulations which govern private sector industries. Depending
upon the transmittable nature of the disease, an employee may be subject to lawful
termination depending on his or her infection status. For example, the Michigan
Department of Public Health adopted and incorporated the United States Public Health
Service transmittable disease regulation which reads, in part:
No person, while infected with a disease in a communicable form that can be transmitted by
foods or who is a carrier of organisms that can cause such a disease or while afflicted with a
boil, an infected wound, or an acute respiratory infection, shall work in a food service
establishment in any capacity in which there is a likelihood of such person contaminating

performed for disabled or protected class employees. For example, modified face masks for interpreters or others
who directly communicate with a hearing-impaired employee who reads lips or modified rules based on an
employee’s religious restrictions or beliefs. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1202(1)(b) (2020).
204. See, e.g., id.
205. Id.
206. Merillat v. Mich. State Univ., 523 N.W.2d 802 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
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food or food-contact surfaces with pathogenic organisms or transmitting disease to other
persons. 207

Further, Michigan law authorizes in pertinent part:
(1) If the department or a local health department has reasonable cause to suspect possible
disease transmission by an employee of a food service establishment, it may secure a
morbidity history of the suspected employee and make any other investigation as may be
deemed necessary.
(2) The department or a local health department may order an owner, operator, or person in
charge of a food service establishment to do any of the following if a communicable disease
is suspected or confirmed:
(a) Immediately exclude the employee from working in the food service establishment.
***
(c) Restrict the employee’s service to some area of the food service establishment, as
approved by the department or the local health department, where there is no danger of
transmitting disease.
(d) Require or provide for adequate medical or laboratory examination of the employee and
other employees and of their body discharges.
(3) The owner, operator, or person in charge of a food service establishment shall exclude
from the food service establishment any employee with a suspected communicable
disease.208

When this state regulation is applied during the coronavirus pandemic, a restaurant
or food service employer must prohibit all coronavirus-infected employees from working
in any capacity in which they may handle food or come into contact with surfaces or
objects which may touch food.209 In essence, the Michigan Public Health Code authorizes
an employer or health department to lawfully discriminate against an employee who has
or is reasonably suspected of having COVID-19 or another contagious disease that may
be transmitted through contact with food or surfaces.210 Additionally, this provision does
not trigger employee protection under Section 202(1)(b) of Michigan’s HCRA because the
virus or “handicap” directly interferes with the employee’s ability to perform the duties
specific to that employment. 211
For the strongest defense against COVID-19 employee discrimination claims, a
business owner’s legal counsel must be well versed in the state-specific adoptions and
legislation governing their specific business sector. Proper knowledge of federal and state
law interrelationships may dramatically impact the probability of a successful defense
verdict in the courtroom.

207. Pursuant to § 12909(1) of the Michigan Public Health Code, the Michigan Department of Public Health
adopted and incorporated within its rules the provisions of the 1976 recommendations of the United States Public
Health Service, found in the publication entitled “Food Service Sanitation Manual.” 1981 AACS, R
325.25103(b), provision adopted is § 3-101.
208. 1981 AACS, R 325.25909(3).
209. Pursuant to § 12909(1) of the Michigan Public Health Code, the Michigan Department of Public Health
adopted and incorporated within its rules the provisions of the 1976 recommendations of the United States Public
Health Service found in the publication entitled “Food Service Sanitation Manual.” 1981 AACS, R 325.25103(b),
provision adopted is § 3-101.
210. See generally id.
211. Id.
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VI. NURSING HOME NEGLIGENCE AND WRONGFUL DEATH
A difficult aspect of COVID-19 insurance defense will, without a doubt, be litigating
claims involving the loss of life. Tragically, elderly Americans living in long term care
facilities, such as nursing homes, are among the most vulnerable to the disease. 212 The
CDC reports that over eighty percent (80%) of coronavirus deaths are among adults over
the age of sixty-five (65).213 More than twenty-five hundred (2,500) nursing home
facilities in thirty-six (36) states have reported COVID-19-positive residents due to the
inability to contain the outbreak.214 This has led to an alarming surge of more than
seventy-three hundred (7,300) confirmed COVID-19 deaths linked to nursing homes.215
As more adults over the age of sixty-five (65) in the U.S. have now died of COVID-19
than were killed in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it is fair to say that the
memory of what is ongoing in these nursing facilities will not end with the pandemic. 216
Foreseeably, nursing homes will face intense investigations into their compliance
with all infection and disease prevention and control procedures and professional standards
of care guidelines. As an estimated seventy-five percent (75%) of long term care facilities
are actively noncompliant with federal infection and disease control regulations, COVID19 loss-of-life litigation will primarily consist of wrongful death and negligence claims
against nursing home facilities and medical staff.217 Due to the heightened risk for
emotionally charged, excessive jury verdicts, it is imperative that nursing home defendants
not only litigate on technical regulatory and legal compliance, but also on the facts and
reality of providing geriatric healthcare during a pandemic.
President Trump has implemented the CARES Act, a $2 trillion stimulus package
that protects volunteer healthcare workers from certain civil liability. 218 In addition,
several state lawmakers are taking steps to protect healthcare providers by providing civil
medical immunity.219 However, the immunity would not protect nursing homes against

212. Suzy Khimm, et al., More than 2,200 coronavirus deaths in nursing homes, but federal government isn’t
tracking them, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-2-200-coronavirusdeaths-nursing-homes-federal-government-isn-n1181026.
213. CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Severe Outcomes Among Patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19)–United
States,
February
12–March
16,
2020,
CDC
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6912e2-H.pdf.
214. Khimm, supra note 212.
215. Matthew Mosk, et al., Inside nursing homes, coronavirus brings isolation and 7,300 deaths; Outside,
families yearn for news, ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/inside-nursing-homescoronavirus-brings-isolation-7300-deaths/story?id=70225836.
216. The Associated Press, Coronavirus in US: More Americans have died from COVID-19 than in 9/11
attacks, SYRACUSE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.syracuse.com/coronavirus/2020/03/coronavirus-in-us-moreamericans-have-died-of-covid-19-than-in-911-attacks.html.
217. Danielle Leigh, About 75% of nursing homes cited, violating standards to prevent the spread of disease,
ABC 7 NY (Mar. 13, 2020), https://abc7ny.com/7-on-your-side-infectious-disease-nursing-home-homes-inunited-states/6010241/.
218. Y. Peter Kang, 6 States With COVID-19 Medical Immunity, And 2 Without, LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1264964/6-states-with-covid-19-medical-immunity-and-2-without.
219. For example, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, and other states have
implemented some type of immunity for health care providers. Id. Other states, such as Oklahoma, are in the
process of providing medical immunity. Sarah Jarvis, Oklahoma House Passes COVID-19 Civil Immunity Bill,
LAW360 (May 5, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1270712/oklahoma-house-passes-covid-19-civilimmunity-bill.
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civil cases involving claims such as willful, reckless or criminal misconduct or gross
negligence.220
A. Crisis Standard of Care vs. Longstanding Standard of Care Guidelines.
Both federal and state laws establish standard of care requirements for an assisted
living program to classify as a nursing facility.221 Federal regulations require that the
standard of care for long term care facilities “must establish and maintain an infection
prevention and control program (“IPCP”) designed to provide a safe, sanitary, and
comfortable environment and to help prevent the development and transmission of
communicable diseases and infections.”222 Under 42 C.F.R. § 483.80, the IPCP must
include several precautionary measures such as:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

v.

vi.

A system of surveillance designed to identify possible communicable
diseases or infections before they can spread to other persons in the facility;
When and to whom possible incidents of communicable diseases or
infections should be reported;
Standard and transmission-based precautions to be followed to prevent
spread of infections;
When and how isolation should be used for a resident, including but not
limited to:
a. The type and duration of the isolation, depending upon the
infectious agent or organism involved, and
b. A requirement that the isolation should be the least restrictive
possible for the resident under the circumstances.
The circumstances under which the facility must prohibit employees with
a communicable disease or infected skin lesions from direct contact with
residents or their food, if direct contact will transmit the disease; and
The hand hygiene procedures to be followed by staff involved in direct
resident contact.

In April 2020, the first wrongful death lawsuit against a long term nursing care
facility was filed in connection to the death of a COVID-19-infected resident.223 In
Deborah de los Angeles v. Life Care Centers of America Inc. d/b/a Life Care Center of
Kirkland, et al., Plaintiff, Deborah de los Angeles, alleges that her 85-year-old mother,
Twilla Morin, was a nursing home resident in Defendant’s Kirkland, Washington, facility
when she became infected with the virus and ultimately succumbed to the disease.224
Plaintiff contends that the nursing home failed to timely report or control the outbreak of
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Moore v. Warr Acres Nursing Ctr., LLC, 376 P.3d 894, 903 (Okla. 2016) (Oklahoma law
requires that a nursing facility comply with all federal, state, and local laws regarding regulations and professional
standards of care); 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (2020).
222. 42 C.F.R. §.483.80 (2020).
223. Complaint, De los Angeles v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., et al., No. 20-2-07689-9 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
2020).
224. Id. at 2.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2020

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4

196

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:169

the contagious respiratory illness that was first documented at the facility on February 10,
2020.225 The Complaint states that “[a]lthough defendants were on high-alert for COVID19 since January 2020, they lacked a clear plan of action leading to a systemic failure.”226
Further, Defendant’s staff are accused of continuing the day-to-day operations of the
facility in a manner which enabled the virus to thrive in the most vulnerable of
environments.227 Plaintiff argues that, in February 2020 “[i]nstead of quarantining
residents and staff, defendants admitted new residents and threw a Mardi Gras party.
Instead of immediately notifying authorities of a ‘flu’ outbreak, defendants sat on it for 17
days before reporting anything.”228
Undoubtedly, Plaintiff is arguing negligence and wrongful death liability against the
nursing home for a breach in the professional standard of care which allegedly resulted in
the uncontrollable spread of the virus among elderly residents and staff. 229 While there is
a longstanding standard of care framework regulating nursing homes and their personnel,
it is not without some degree of circumstantial fluidity.230
Dependent upon the facts, Life Care Center of Kirkland’s best defense is likely that
it was operating under crisis standard of care guidelines during the coronavirus pandemic
and not simply the longstanding professional standards of care for nursing homes and
healthcare personnel.231 Crisis standard of care guidelines supplement the traditional rules
in unorthodox circumstances justifying a substantial change in the level of care it is
possible to provide.232 Specifically, the American Nurses Association (“ANA”) defines
“Crisis Standard of Care” as follows:
[A] substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to
deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive (e.g. pandemic influenza) or catastrophic
(e.g. earthquake, hurricane) disaster. This change in the level of care delivered is justified by
specific circumstances and is formally declared by a state government, in recognition that
crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period. The formal declaration that crisis
standards of care are in operation enables specific legal/regulatory powers and protections
for healthcare providers in the necessary tasks of allocating and using scarce medical
resources and implementing alternate care facility operations.233

According to the ANA, during “a pandemic, nurses can find themselves operating
in environments demanding a balance between time-limited crisis standards of care and
longstanding professional standards of care.”234 As such, variances “in the standard of
care can occur in circumstances when available resources are limited or when a clinician

225. Id. at 5.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id.
228. Complaint at 2, De los Angeles, No. 20-2-07689-9 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2020).
229. Id. at 8.
230. See
generally
Crisis
Standard
of
Care
COVID-19
Pandemic,
ANA,
https://www.nursingworld.org/~496044/globalassets/practiceandpolicy/work-environment/health—
safety/coronavirus/crisis-standards-of-care.pdf (last visited May 9, 2020).
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing IOM Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations, 2012).
234. Id.
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is practicing in an unusual setting or with unfamiliar patient care needs.” 235 Hospitals,
nursing homes and medical personnel now “find themselves operating in crisis standards
of care environments.”236Nursing homes and long term care facilities are given detailed
guidance on how to operate under crisis standard of care procedures during disaster
situations.237 Specifically, the guidelines incorporate the following:
i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

A duty to care during crises like pandemics. Employers and supervisors
have a corresponding duty to reduce risks to nursing staff safety, plan for
competing priorities like childcare, and address moral distress and other
injuries to personal and professional integrity such crisis events can cause;
A specific balance of professional standards and crisis standards of care
will be based on the reality of the specific situation, such as the presence
or absence of necessary equipment, medications or colleagues;
Decision-making during extreme conditions can shift ethical standards to a
utilitarian framework in which the clinical goal is the greatest good for
the greatest number of individuals, but that shift must not
disproportionately burden those who already suffer healthcare disparities
and social injustice;
Sacrifices in desired care must be fairly shared. This means that care
decisions are not about “the best that can be done” under normal conditions.
They are necessarily constrained by the specific conditions during the
crisis.
Registered nurses may be asked to delegate care to others, such as
students, staff displaced from another institution, or volunteers. This
will require a rapid assessment of the skills of the others available to assist
in patient care. Nurses must continue to emphasize patient safety and
appropriate delegation.
An increased reliance on a nurse’s own or the collective accumulated
competence may be needed, as the usual range of colleagues, experts
or support services may not be available.238

Additionally, institutional crisis standard of care guidelines for the nursing home
facility’s operation in a major disaster scenario include:
i.

ii.

235.
236.
237.
238.

Institutions and healthcare systems have a duty to safeguard employees
with policies and practices that are evidence-based, transparently decided
and have clear accountabilities;
In a healthcare system characterized by structural racism, income
inequality and healthcare disparities, a “first come first served” approach
may compound existing injustice. Healthcare systems must counter these

ANA, supra note 230.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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impacts with efforts to protect at-risk populations;
A range of contingencies must be planned for by accountable
decisionmakers as demand for care increases and resources, such as staff
and materials, become scarce;
Essential decisions about allocation of resources must be made at systems
and community levels;
The individual registered nurse should remain focused on patients and is
responsible for giving the best possible care with available resources;
Decisions at the system level must be:
a. Fair – Decision-making standards should be recognized as fair by
all those affected by them.
b. Equitable – The process used to make decisions about scarce
resources should be transparent, consistent, proportional to the
scale of the emergency and degree of scarce resources, and
accountable for appropriate protections and the just allocation of
available resources.

B. Notice Requiring Action.
Nursing homes are trained and equipped for the prevention and control of diseases
and infections that commonly afflict elderly residents. Bed sores, staph infections, and the
flu are all common medical complications requiring the traditional standard of care seen
within any typical nursing home environment. However, Life Care Center of Kirkland and
other nursing homes across the country combatted a novel coronavirus that is considerably
unlike any communal disease ever encountered in the United States.239
During his call for a global plan of action against the disease, United Nations
Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, regarded the coronavirus pandemic as “the greatest
test” our world has endured since World War II and a “human crisis” of historical
proportions.240 COVID-19 stands apart from other commonly contracted viruses in its
high rate of transmission from non-symptomatic carriers and the speed in which it spreads
from person to person.241 “In general, when the flu hits you, people lie in bed and don’t
go out,” said Dr. Simone Wildes, an infectious disease specialist at South Shore Health.242
“But something we are seeing with COVID-19 is that, because the symptoms are mild for
most of the population, they can go out and spread the disease quite easily, especially given
how long you can be infectious for.”243
In the Life Care Center of Kirkland case, the nursing home has a strong defense that
it did not act negligently during the timeframe in which Plaintiff’s mother contracted the
virus as it was operating within the professional standards of care guidelines and without
239. Vinayak Kumar, COVID-19 has been compared to the flu. Experts say that’s wrong, ABC NEWS (Mar.
27, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/covid-19-compared-flu-experts-wrong/story?id=69779116.
240. Darryl Coote, U.N.: COVID-19 is ‘greatest test’ since World War II, UPI (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/04/01/UN-COVID-19-is-greatest-test-since-World-WarII/9631585722662/.
241. Kumar, supra note 239.
242. Id.
243. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/4

30

Baird: Litigating an Invisible Enemy: Will the United States Insurance I

2021]

LITIGATING AN INVISIBLE ENEMY

199

notice of a national crisis. Plaintiff alleges that the nursing home was on notice of the
pandemic dangers to its residents since January 2020 and that it negligently failed to take
preventative measures to quarantine and discontinue patient admissions into the facility in
February 2020.244 Plaintiff’s argument is weak, as the United States was not on notice of
a domestic crisis during this timeframe. It was not until March 13, 2020, that President
Donald J. Trump declared the coronavirus disease as a national emergency in the United
States.245 President Trump’s emergency determination came only two (2) days after the
World Health Organization officially categorized COVID-19 as a global pandemic.246 The
first statewide stay-at-home “quarantine” order for Washington State was issued by
Governor Jay Inslee on March 23, 2020.247 Life Care Center of Kirkland has a strong
defense against the claim that it was negligent in its care from January–February 2020 if
it operated within the professional standard of care guidelines prior to an official notice of
the coronavirus pandemic by federal or state authorities. Further, Life Care Center of
Kirkland should argue that COVID-19 guidelines for long term care facilities and nursing
homes on coronavirus prevention and control, resident quarantine, symptoms of infection,
and mandatory reporting of infection rates to the health departments were not released by
the CDC until April 4, 2020.248
As the events described above unfolded in quick succession, Life Care Center of
Kirkland and similarly situated defendants must immediately establish a timeline of
COVID-19 occurrences within their facilities to defend themselves against allegations that
they failed to act or follow standard of care guidelines. The defendant’s documentation
should include the date a resident first became symptomatic, actions taken by health care
personnel, and the progression of the illness over time (e.g., did the nursing home
resident’s health decline immediately or over the course of several days, were there any
clear indicators for the necessity of medical intervention, and, if applicable, when the
patient was transported to a hospital or placed under the care of a medical doctor). Overall,
a nursing home defendant should not be held legally liable for the death of a COVID-19infected resident if the facility’s health care personnel followed the longstanding standard
of care guidelines for disease prevention and control prior to notice of a national
emergency and/or before the publication of the CDC’s crisis standard of care
recommendations for coronavirus disease control.

244. Complaint at 1, 3, De los Angeles, No. 20-2-07689-9.
245. Letter from Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, to Secretary Wolf, Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and
Administrator Gaynor (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the White House) (available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determinationstafford-act/).
246. Tamara Keith & Malaka Gharib, A Timeline of Coronavirus Comments From President Trump And WHO,
NPR (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/15/835011346/a-timeline-ofcoronavirus-comments-from-president-trump-and-who.
247. Washington’s stay-at-home order extended to May 4, KING5 (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.king5.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/inslee-extends-washington-stay-home-mandatethrough-may-4/281-e08790db-aa54-4718-8e2b-a7712ebc92e5.
248. Coronavirus Disease 2019: Nursing Homes & Long-Term Care Facilities, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2020).
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VII. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Business closures, layoffs, financial losses, negligence, physical injuries, and event
cancellations created an unprecedented risk to corporations immeasurable to any other
event in American history. The chaos of the pandemic opened the door to opportunistic
litigators seeking the chance to file class action lawsuits on behalf of employees,
consumers, patients, and injured citizens who allege they were disproportionately harmed
by the COVID-19 pandemic. As no industry appears to be litigation proof, corporations
must prepare for exhaustive legal battles in both the private and public sectors.
A. Categories of Lawsuits.
There are several industries at high risk for COVID-19 class action lawsuits.
Lawsuits have already been filed in each of the six (6) major industries identified below.
First, class action lawsuits against insurers. Insurance providers arguably have the
highest risk for COVID-19 class action lawsuits.249 Insurers have seen a high volume of
class action litigation since the start of the pandemic arising from force majeure and other
contractual claims.250 These insurers have a heighted risk to these types of claims because
of their presence across a plethora of industries and situations. 251
Second, class action lawsuits against travel and event providers. Travel agencies,
entertainment venues and attractions, and ticket brokers face litigation for event-related
cancellations and travel.252 It appears that the U.S. airlines industry has been hit especially
hard with class action lawsuits against four (4) major airliners. 253 United Airlines, Delta
Air Lines, American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines have all been sued by customers for
claims involving COVID-19-related cancellations, limited flight booking dates and
refund-related complaints.254
In the Delta Air Lines class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege the airliner participated
in unfair and deceitful practices by failing to honor its ticket refund policies and requests
from passengers during the coronavirus outbreak.255 According to Plaintiffs, Delta Air
Lines’ (“Delta”) Contract of Carriage states that, if the airline cancelled or changed a flight
time by more than ninety (90) minutes, passengers were entitled to the option of a full
249. See, e.g., Ed Treleven, Class-action lawsuit joins growing number over business interruption insurance
denials amid COVID-19 pandemic, WIS. STATE J. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/crimeand-courts/class-action-lawsuit-joins-growing-number-over-business-interruption-insurance-denials-amidcovid-19-pandemic/article_e9f48697-6a31-54fd-bd72-1c2d7a8b1f0d.html.
250. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Oliver, Contractual Distancing: Pandemic Insurance Litigation Spreads with
Business
Interruption
Claim
Denials,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Apr.
19,
2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/contractual-distancing-pandemic-insurance-litigation-spreads-businessinterruption.
251. Cruise lines, airlines, and other travel companies have been sued for allegedly failing to maintain a safe
environment and for alleged damages relating to delays or cancellations.
252. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Rudolph, et al. v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 1:20-cv-02142
(N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 6, 2020); Complaint at 4, Daniels, et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01664-ELR
(N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 17, 2020); Complaint at 4, Ward, et al. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00371-Y (N.D.
Tex. filed Apr. 22, 2020); Complaint at 2, Bombin, et al. v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. 5:20-cv-01883 (E.D. Pa. filed
Apr. 13, 2020).
253. See sources cited supra note 252.
254. See sources cited supra note 252.
255. Complaint at 2, Daniels, No. 1:20-cv-01664-ELR (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 17, 2020).
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refund.256 Delta is alleged to have violated its policy by only issuing travel credits instead
of full refunds to its customers.257 Further, Plaintiffs claim Delta’s website had a
“Coronavirus Travel Updates” banner and a large red button to entice consumers to
“Change or Cancel” their flights, yet does not include or provide easy access to the full
refund request form.258 The lawsuit against Delta seeks refunds on original ticket
purchases, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for cancelled flight reimbursement.259
Third, class action lawsuits against financial institutions and debt collectors.
COVID-19 has sparked civil action against lenders and debt collectors to prevent punitive
measures being taken against terminated and furloughed employees unable to pay their
expenditures.260 The United States government stepped in to provide temporary relief to
debtors, but inevitably foreclosures and debt collections have led to substantial litigation
against financial institutions seeking to recover on past-due loans and mortgages.261
Fourth, class action lawsuits against retailers who price gouge products during the
pandemic. From the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States,
opportunistic retailers took advantage of the national crisis as a money-making scheme.262
High-demand items such as hand sanitizer, toilet paper, face masks, digital thermometers,
and surgical gowns were sold at dramatic markups.263 The inflation rates of some essential
items became so severe that President Trump issued an Executive Order making it illegal
to hoard and price gouge critical medical supplies needed to combat COVID-19.264
Already, consumers have filed legal action against major retailers who have participated
in price-hiking tactics. For example, Amazon.com has been sued for its alleged price
gouging of toilet paper and hand sanitizer at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic.265
E-commerce giant, eBay Inc., has also been sued in a class action lawsuit by consumers
who are alleged to have paid upwards of $585.00 for a three-pack of N95 masks, the same
product that sold for less than $10.00 prior to the virus outbreak.266 Consumers also stated
they paid $227.50 for a five-pack of Lysol spray cans and almost $50.00 for twelve (12)
rolls of Cottonelle toilet paper.267 These examples are just two of the dozens of major
256. Id. at 5.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 5–6.
259. Id. at 15–16.
260. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Shu൵, et al. v. Bank of Am., et al., No. 5:20-cv-00184 (S.D.W. Va. filed Mar.
20, 2020).
261. On March 27, 2020, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act with a sixty (60)-day foreclosure moratorium covering most American
residential mortgage loans. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
262. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Armas v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 104631782 (11th Cir. 2020).
263. See id.; Long Island Man Charged Under Defense Production Act with Hoarding and Price-Gouging of
Scarce Personal Protective Equipment, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usaoedny/pr/long-island-man-charged-under-defense-production-act-hoarding-and-price-gouging-scarc-0.
264. E.g., disposable masks, surgical gowns, ventilators, and other professional protective equipment. WHITE
HOUSE, President Donald J. Trump Will Not Tolerate the Price Gouging and Hoarding of Critical Supplies
Needed to Combat the Coronavirus (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-will-not-tolerate-price-gouging-hoarding-critical-supplies-needed-combatcoronavirus/.
265. Complaint at 3, Armas, No. 104631782.
266. Complaint, eBay Inc. v. Boch, et al., No. 5:19-cv004422 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
267. Id.
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retailers facing civil litigation for price gouging during the national crisis. 268
Fifth, class actions against manufacturers and/or retailers of professional protective
gear and products. The maker of Purell hand sanitizer is facing two class action lawsuits
by consumers claiming the manufacturer made misleading claims when it advertised that
its product killed “99.9 percent of illness-causing germs.”269 The Plaintiffs alleged the
claims are not based in scientific fact and that Purell made substantial profit during the
pandemic while breaking the public’s trust.270 This is not the first instance where Purell
has been accused of playing off the fears of the public by alleged misrepresentation of its
product’s effectiveness against diseases like the coronavirus.271 On January 17, 2020,
Purell was warned by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that it needed to refrain from
advertising unsubstantiated claims that its products effectively killed the flu and many
infectious diseases.272 As the products will be in high demand for the foreseeable future,
it is likely this will become a heavily litigated industry by decade’s end.
Finally, class action lawsuits against issuers. As discussed in greater detail in the
D&O Liability section of this article, securities class action lawsuits are a major area of
COVID-19 corporate litigation.273 These lawsuits center around corporate mishandlings
and deceitful behavior related to the pandemic and pandemic-related business
decisions.274 Corporations in industries across the country have received backlash in the
form of securities class action lawsuits by shareholders for share losses sustained during
the national crisis and allegedly due to the business decisions of directors and officers of
the corporations.275
B. Available Defenses to Class Action Claims.
Several potential defenses are available to corporations facing COVID-19-related
class action lawsuits. Specific defenses will be determined based on consideration of the
legal contracts and agreements and the factual circumstances of subject litigation. The
major areas of defense are discussed in detail below.
Personal jurisdiction. A defendant must determine if there are grounds to challenge
personal jurisdiction at the commencement of the litigation.276 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a party may assert the lack of personal jurisdiction
defense before pleading. In a civil class action lawsuit, a defendant must look at each

268. Costco, Walmart, Kroger, and several other merchants are named retailers in class action lawsuits for the
alleged price gouging of essential groceries such as eggs. Michael Batriromo, Costco, Walmart, Kroger ‘Grossly
Inflated’ the Price of Eggs During Pandemic, Lawsuit Claims, OZARKSFIRST (May 3, 2020),
https://www.ozarksfirst.com/life-health/coronavirus/costco-walmart-kroger-grossly-inflated-the-price-of-eggsduring-pandemic-lawsuit-claims/.
269. Complaint at 1–2, Miller, et al. v. Gojo Indus., et al., No. 4:2020-cv-00562 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
270. Id.
271. Letter from Nicholas F. Lyons, Director of Compliance, FDA, to Carey Jaros, President and CEO, GOJO
industries Inc. (Jan. 17, 2020) (On file with the FDA).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Douglas, 2020 WL 1226410 (S.D. 2020); Complaint at 2, McDermid, 2020
WL 1227260 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
274. See, e.g., id.
275. See, e.g., id.
276. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/4

34

Baird: Litigating an Invisible Enemy: Will the United States Insurance I

2021]

LITIGATING AN INVISIBLE ENEMY

203

plaintiff’s cause of action and its specific connection to the forum to determine if the court
has general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant for every individual claim.277 If the
nexus is insufficient, a defendant should file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction prior to filing its answer.278 It is also vital to note that this defense must be
asserted within a defendant’s first responsive pleading or the defense will be waived.
Lack of standing. Adequate substitution in a bargained-for exchange is a defense
against civil action lawsuits for breach of contract. For example, events that were simply
postponed during the shutdown and rescheduled during a time after the reopening of the
economy provide acceptable substitutions for performance in many cases. Defendants
should argue that plaintiffs have no standing in these circumstances as in many scenarios
no injury ultimately occurred.
No breach. Class action defendants must consider if the relevant contracts contained
provisions which allowed them to substitute services or reparation for equal/greater than
contract price. These are common and enforceable provisions that offer an avenue to
perform the contract in a different manner and effectively litigate a no-breach defense.
Force majeure. Class action lawsuits resulting from breach of contract claims must
raise the defense that COVID-19 constitutes a force majeure event rendering contractual
performance impossible.279 Force majeure provisions are found in several commercial
agreements and provide a contractual defense that holds a party harmless when events
from a “superior force” or “act of God” render performance impossible. 280 In the United
States, contractual interpretation and disputes are governed by state law; a defendant must
look to prior catastrophic occurrences for legal precedent and guidance on how the court
will rule on COVID-19 breach of contract claims.
Frustration of purpose or impossibility. If a contract does not contain a force
majeure provision, a defendant may still argue that COVID-19 irreparably frustrated the
purpose of its contract or simply made performance an impossibility. 281 If the contract is
for the sale or lease of goods, then Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2.615 and 2A.405 are
the best defense against the impracticability of the contract. For example, if an event
planner contracted with a local tavern for beverage supply for a large St. Patrick’s Day
event but the event was canceled due to the coronavirus outbreak, this would constitute a
frustration of purpose of their contractual agreement.282 If unforeseen circumstances
render the purpose of the contract frustrated or impossible to perform, there are legal
grounds for breaking the contract without liability for breach. 283
Enforcement of class action waiver or arbitration provisions. It is common for
employment-related agreements to contain waivers and provisions within the contract that
prohibit class action litigation for alternative dispute resolution platforms such as

277. Bristol-Meyers Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
278. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
279. See Christine Mathias, Coronavirus and Business Contracts: When Performance Becomes Impossible or
Impracticable, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/coronavirus-and-business-contracts-whenperformance-becomes-impossible-or-impracticable.html (last visited May 13, 2020) (emphasis added).
280. See id.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. See id.
283. See id.
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arbitration.284 Class action lawsuit waivers have been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court and will undoubtedly be contested in several COVID-19 cases brought
before the courts.285 Defendants and employers will likely succeed in enforcing these
waivers for the arbitration alternative based on legal precedent. 286
Unenforceability due to changes in applicable law. Stay-at-home executive orders
and government-mandated non-essential business closures made it impossible for certain
service contracts and agreements to be fulfilled. Under these circumstances, class action
defendants will succeed against claims of breach in contracts where performance was
made illegal under COVID-19 executive orders.
Lack of causation. In class action lawsuits for intentional and negligent torts,
plaintiffs must establish the nexus between the alleged harm and the defendants’ conduct.
As discussed in the D&O Liability section of this article, the physical and economic
devastation from the pandemic provides a strong intervening cause defense to the
presumption that a class action defendant’s actions directly caused the alleged injury.
Economic loss doctrine. This defense is available when plaintiffs inflate their
damages to unreasonable or unrealistic monetary value. 287 In Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth
Judicial District Court, the court ruled that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff’s
negligent misrepresentation claim against a general contractor for work performed by an
undisclosed subcontractor.288 The Halcrow court reasoned that the economic loss doctrine
is justified in order to properly protect parties from unlimited or inflated economic liability
in professional negligence claims.289 While the full scope of the doctrine is jurisdictionally
dependent, defendants to class action claims must argue the economic loss doctrine to
protect themselves against excessive plaintiff recovery.290
Lack of class commonality. Class action defendants must evaluate the legal and
factual distinctions of plaintiffs’ claims in order to defeat class action certification.
Legally, defendants must look for differences in the relevant timeframe and contractual
language of each plaintiff’s claim. Factually, defendants may find distinct variations in the
circumstances leading to the alleged harmful conduct. Defendants must evaluate this
evidence to consider if there is a lack of commonality among plaintiffs sufficient to defeat
the class action certification.
VIII.

THE POST-PANDEMIC AMERICAN JURY POOL

There has been a noticeable shift in the public’s opinion of the United States’ judicial
system over the last several decades. At the turn of the century, the tort reform political
movement was thriving, and anti-litigation mentality strongly resonated with everyday

284. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1618 (2018).
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 302 P.3d 1148 (Nev. 2013).
288. Id. at 1150.
289. Id.
290. Gale Burns, TORTS: Economic Loss Doctrine as a Bar to Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, NAT.
LEGAL RESEARCH GRP. INC. (Dec. 30, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.nlrg.com/public-law-legalresearch/bid/101458/TORTS-Economic-Loss-Doctrine-as-a-Bar-to-Negligent-Misrepresentation-Claims.
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Americans.291 The main concerns for our judicial system centered around a perceived
unhealthy trend of frivolous lawsuits and exaggerated damages.292 The majority of
citizens were of the opinion that the extensive influx of litigation in the court systems was
damaging to the American economy and the root cause of increasing insurance premiums
across the country.293 However, corporate condemnation had been slowly building since
the early 2000s after a series of white-collar corruption scandals and corporate executive
arrests.294 By decade’s end, the impact of corporate catastrophes like the Enron collapse
transformed the prospective juror mentality from plaintiff skepticism to the anti-corporate
attitude of present day.295
A. Historical Overview of Social Inflation and Nuclear Verdicts.
Long before the COVID-19 shutdown, the United States endured the largest
economic disaster since the Great Depression during the 2008 financial crisis.296 By 2009,
the flood of stories about billion dollar corporate bailouts stood in stark contrast to the
apparent lack of safety nets being provided to working class America. 297 For many
Americans, the story of the 2008 financial catastrophe was simple: Wall Street had been
bailed out and Main Street had been abandoned.
In the years that followed, the market bounced back and progressed through its
longest expansion in history.298 Meanwhile, employment rates and hourly wages remained
stagnant.299 As the middle class shrank, the American jury pool began to shape a “two
Americas: one for the elite and one for the rest of us” mentality. 300 Jurors have steadily
shifted their concern away from the harm of frivolous lawsuits and towards the threat of
corrupt executives and unbridled corporate influence and power. 301 The culture eventually
shifted so strongly that large corporations were being demonized as a group and believed
to be guilty unless proven innocent.302 Consequently, jury verdicts exploded because anticorporate beliefs had become the norm, and the pervasive loss of trust was being reflected
in the deliberation room.303
291. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Where Have All the Cases Gone? The Strange Success of Tort Reform
Revisited, 65 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1446–47, 1449 (2016).
292. Id. at 1469.
293. Id. at 1471.
294. Ken Broda-Bahm, Corporate Corruption: Expect Sensitized Jurors, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR (Feb. 14,
2018), https://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2018/02/corporate-corruption-expect-sensitized-jurors.html.
295. Id.
296. Kimberly Amadeo, 2008 Financial Crisis Causes, Costs, and Whether It Could Happen Again, THE
BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679 (last updated May 7, 2020).
297. Tam Harbert, Here’s How Much the 2008 Bailouts Really Cost, MIT MANAGEMENT SLOAN SCHOOL
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/heres-how-much-2008-bailouts-really-cost.
298. Carmen Reinicke, The US economic expansion is now the longest in history, BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2020,
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Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, a major topic at litigation and risk management
conferences was the concept of social inflation—a sociological term used to describe a
multifaceted trend toward the deterioration of tort reform, increased litigation, more
plaintiff-favorable judicial rulings, generous verdicts, and the onset of the once
unthinkable phenomenon of litigation financing.304 Historically speaking, social inflation
and the resulting tide of outsized verdicts have been the result of a decade of pervasive
anti-corporate attitudes, general pessimism and tribal politics activated and accelerated by
the 2008 financial collapse.305 Looking forward, it is imperative for defendants to
understand the post-pandemic American jury pool mentality and if the social inflation
trend survives the outbreak.
B. The Post-Pandemic Factfinder.
The factual basis of a claim is at the heart of every jury decision. The “story” told
during litigation is essential to how jurors will receive, store, recall, and process the
evidence. As a result, whichever party can tell the story better will have a major impact on
how jurors will evaluate the choices and conduct of the parties involved in the litigation.
Post-pandemic factfinders will analyze the claims by evaluating the intentions of the
parties. Was this person driven by selfishness or sacrifice? Are their plans clever or
crooked? Were their behaviors understandable or careless? Jurors will not always
understand all the technical facts, demonstratives and expert testimony so they will
construct the answers to these questions in the context of a narrative.
Jurors’ preconceived notions of a plaintiff’s or defendant’s moral character will
ultimately determine who must carry the burden of proof at trial. The COVID-19 pandemic
will once again show that new crises can alter old assumptions. During the last century,
we have seen juror perceptions sway from giving defendant insurers and corporations the
benefit of the doubt to forcing them to prove they are “one of the good ones.” 306 The
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on any particular area of litigation will depend on
which groups emerge from the crisis as heroes and which emerge as villains.
The first responders, medical professionals, and essential workers are the heroes of
a post-pandemic America. Parties to a lawsuit who are essential workers will have a
stronger advantage in litigation than they did before the COVID-19 crisis. Stories of
essential workers unable to quarantine are often juxtaposed with stories of the elite who
experience the pandemic as a momentary inconvenience.307
Despite the demands of first responders, the American workforce has experienced
unprecedented rates of unemployment from the COVID-19 economic shutdown.308
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Verdicts in employment litigation hinge on whether jurors can best see themselves in the
shoes of the employee or the employer. The impact of having thirty-six (36) million
citizens live through the stress, trauma and aftermath of unemployment during the
government-ordered shutdowns must not be underestimated.309 The gratitude of the nation
is so strong that doctors and nurses in medical malpractice suits are more likely to be
viewed favorably even in non-COVID-19-related cases. Meanwhile, stories of
incompetence, corruption and fraud underlying the lack of medical supplies and infectious
disease readiness could result in the broad demonizing of health care administrators.
Historically, in nursing home litigation, it has been common for jurors to express a
belief that the wage-and-hour staff were likely undertrained, unskilled, and perhaps even
morally suspect. COVID-19 stories of the sacrifice and heroism of aging services staff and
medical professionals have changed these assumptions radically and thus changed the risk
profile for aging services claims even if no COVID-19-relevant facts or claims are present.
Consequently, any nursing home or long-term care facility that is accused of being
unprepared for even a normal flu season may become a flashpoint for juror outrage.
As the country shifts from quarantine to a post-pandemic America, attention will
increasingly be turned toward finding someone to blame. The stories of corruption, fraud,
incompetence, and collusion are surfacing during America’s worst economic crisis, and
litigation involving claims reminiscent of these stories are a target for juror anger and
frustration.
IX. CONCLUSION
Retired United States Army Command Sergeant Major Michael Mabee once said,
“[w]e are not preparing for the world we live in—we are preparing for the world we find
ourselves in.”310 This statement holds true now more than ever. The influx of
unprecedented civil litigation creates an intense pressure on the judiciary to rule in a
manner that is both fair and consistent during extraordinary times. As the United States
emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, it is necessary that the American legal system fluently
adapts to post-pandemic litigation and that policymakers and judicature engage in a civil
dialogue which ensures a just societal outcome.
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